DePaul University
From the SelectedWorks of Donald Hermann

January 26, 2016

Extending the Fundamental Right of Marriage to
Same-Sex Couples: The United States Supreme
Court Decision in Obergefell v. Hodges
Donald H. J. Hermann, DePaul University

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/donald-hermann/2/

EXTENDING THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF MARRIAGE TO
SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT DECISION IN OBERGEFELL V. HODGES
DONALD H. J. HERM ANN *
The decision by the United States Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges1
was greeted by newspaper headlines as an “historic ruling for gay rights”2 and a
decision mandating “equal dignity”3 for gays and lesbians. Although the Court’s
opinion significantly extends the right to marry to gays and lesbians, it
establishes no identifiable legal doctrine on which to base further legal demands
for equality outside of marriage. It is noteworthy that the Court’s opinion did not
rest on an analysis of the rights of gays and lesbians as a class established as
litigants who deserve equal treatment because of discrimination or subjected to
some level heightened scrutiny because of discrimination directed at a suspect
class.4 Instead, the Court primarily based its decision on a consideration of the
right to marriage as a fundamental right whose benefits could not be denied to
same-sex couples since there is no justified basis for such denial.5 The Court held
that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all states
and that there is no lawful basis for a state to refuse to recognize a lawful samesex marriage performed in another state.6 The Court’s decision does have
implications for gays and lesbians with regard to all the rights and benefits of
marriage and family, including the adoption of children and the right to access
reproductive technologies. However, the decision provides no direct legal
authority to claims for protection from discrimination in employment or access
to other forms of accommodation. For example, the consequence is that although
gays and lesbians have the right to reveal their sexual orientation when exercising
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1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. Dawn Rhodes et al., Historic Ruling for Gay Rights, Court’s Decision Legalizes SameSex Marriage, CHI. TRIB., June 27, 2015, at 1.
3. Equal Dignity, 5-4 Ruling Makes Same-Sex Marriage a Right Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 2015, at A1.
4. Cf. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). In these six consolidated cases, gay
and lesbian couples sought recognition of their committed relations as marriages. Plaintiffs argued
that the discrimination against their relationships violated the equality guaranteed in the state
constitution. Id. at 404. They argued that the discrimination was subject to strict scrutiny because
the exclusion of same-sex couples from state marriage law rested upon two suspect classifications,
sex or sexual orientation. Id. at 446. Moreover, the refusal of a marriage license denied these gay
and lesbian couples a fundamental interest in marriage. Id. The majority opinion in Obergefell
focused on the latter claim.
5. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604-05 (majority opinion).
6. Id. at 2607-08.
http://dx.doi.org/10.18060/4806.0070
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their right to marry, however, employers could terminate their employment upon
learning of their sexual orientation when an employee’s same-sex marriage
becomes publicly known, or a hotel could deny the honeymooning same-sex
couple accommodation, absent protection from discrimination provided in a
minority of jurisdictions.
I. THE COURT ’S OPINION
A. Formulating the Question Before the Court
The initial issue considered by Justice Kennedy who wrote the opinion for
the Court’s five person majority (Justices Kennedy, Ginsberg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan) was the fact that some state statutes and constitutions
defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman.7 Justice Kennedy
treated the “one man and one woman” element as a traditional eligibility criterion
for couples seeking to marry rather than an essential aspect of marriage which
would limit it to opposite-sex partners,8 Justice Kennedy viewed “marriage” as
involving “couples who wish to define themselves by their commitment to each
other.”9
By contrast, Chief Justice Roberts in his dissent understood the fundamental
right to marry as rooted in a “universal definition of marriage as the union of a
man and a woman.”10 Roberts charged that the Court mistakenly treated the
“union of one man and one woman” as an “aspect” of marriage rather than the
“core meaning of marriage [which] has endured.”11 In response to the Chief
Justice, Justice Kennedy echoed the analysis made by Justice Levinson of the
Supreme Court of Hawaii in one of the earliest cases addressing the issue samesex marriage, in which that court ruled that the state’s denial of marriage licenses
to same-sex couples was sex discrimination under the state’s Equal Rights Act.12
Justice Levinson reasoned that “definition of marriage” arguments were circular
and when hundreds of legal rights and duties are at stake in claims to recognition
of civil marriage, a state is required to justify its exclusion of couples from the
benefit and privileges of marriage.13 Justice Kennedy took a similar position in
his opinion when he wrote: “If rights were defined by who exercised them in the
past, then received practices could serve as their own continued justification and
new groups could not invoke rights once denied.”14
The consolidated cases before the United States Supreme Court were on

7. Id. at 2593 (citing MICH. CONST . art. 1, § 25; KY. CONST . § 233A; OHIO REV. CODE §
3101.01 (2014); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18).
8. Id. at 2597.
9. Id. at 2600.
10. Id. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 2615 (majority opinion).
12. Id. at 2596-97.
13. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 73 (Haw. 1983).
14. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (majority opinion).
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appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which had
reversed the judgment of the federal district courts that had heard the cases and
held a state had no constitutional obligation to license same-sex marriage or to
recognize same-sex marriages performed out of state.15 The Supreme Court
granted review on two questions: (1) whether the Fourteenth Amendment
requires a state to license a marriage between two people of the same-sex, and (2)
whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires an instant state to recognize a samesex marriage licensed and performed in another state when the instant state does
not grant that right.16
The Court formulated the issue before it to be whether marriage was a
fundamental right and determined whether the exclusion of same-sex couples
from marriage was justified by an identifiable state interest. Had the Court
formulated the question as to whether there is a right to “same-sex marriage”
would have required the Court to determine whether “same-sex marriage” was
rooted in the nation’s history and traditions or, alternatively, a specific
consideration of gays and lesbians as a class claiming equal protection. The
importance of this initial formulation of the question may be observed in two
earlier Court opinions dealing with sodomy prosecutions of homosexuals.17 In
Bowers v. Hardwick, the first sodomy case decided by the Court, the question
was formulated as follows: “The issue presented is whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy
and hence invalidates the laws of the many states that still make such conduct
illegal and have done so for a long time.”18 In Bowers, the Court easily concluded
that there was no right to engage in homosexual sodomy rooted in our legal or
constitutional history.19 By way of contrast, in Lawrence v. Texas, the second
sodomy case, the Court reasoned that the case involved a liberty interest (the
Court did not use the term fundamental right) to engage in sexual intimacy and
whether homosexuals can be denied that right.20 The Lawrence Court formulated
the question in these terms: “We conclude the case should be resolved by
determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private
conduct in exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”21 The Court in Lawrence concluded:
“When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person,
the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to
make their choice.”22 From this statement, it may be seen that Lawrence not only

15. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 388 (6th Cir. 2014).
16. Id. at 396.
17. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986).
18. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
19. Id. at 186.
20. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
21. Id. at 564.
22. Id. at 567.
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provided the methodological approach for formulating the question to be
considered in Obergefell, it also presaged the decision that the relationship
established by marriage involves a basic right to which same-sex couples could
claim access.
B. Substantive Due Process Analysis
At its heart, the reasoning of the Court is based on substantive due process,
which provides that fundamental liberties are protected under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibiting any state from depriving “any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”23 The Court in
Obergefell took as its basic premise that there are fundamental liberties beyond
those enumerated in the Bill of Rights that are protected by the Due Process
Clause: “In addition these liberties extend to certain personal choices central to
individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal
identity and beliefs.”24
The Court identified its judicial role as identifying and protecting such
fundamental liberties, not by any rigid formula, but by “exercise of reasoned
judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must
accord them its respect.”25 Although there is no rigid formula identifying such
fundamental liberties, it identified history and tradition as providing guidance in
this process.26 The Court found such guidance in its understanding of its previous
opinions.27
The most significant precedent identified by the Court was Loving v.
Virginia, which invalidated penal laws punishing interracial marriage.28 This
decision is understood as establishing that marriage cannot be denied to
interracial couples.29 Two other marriage cases are identified as recognizing a
right to marriage requiring compelling state justification for exclusion of
individuals from access to “one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.”30 In Turner v. Shafley, the right to marry could
not be denied to persons in prison because the right to marry dignifies couples
who wish to define themselves by their commitment to each other.31 The Court

23. U.S. CONST . amend. XIV, § 1.
24. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (majority opinion). The Court cites,
as authority, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484-86 (1965). These cases have particular significance since they involve the right to have
access to contraception by both married couples and single individuals to prevent pregnancy (or
procreation).
25. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
29. See id.
30. Id. at 12.
31. Turner v. Shafley, 782 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987).
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in Zablonki v. Redhail held that the right to marry was unconstitutionally
restricted by prohibiting fathers, who were behind on child support, to marry.32
The Court conceded that its earlier opinions dealt with cases involving
opposite-sex partners.33 However, the Court invoked Lawrence for the
proposition that “same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples
to enjoy intimate association.”34 Rather than emphasizing a historical basis for
the claim of same-sex partners to marry, the Court identified four principles or
traditions, which establish marriage under the Constitution as fundamental, that
have equal significance for same-sex couples: (1) the right to personal choice or
expression of autonomy in intimate association, which “shape an individual’s
destiny” and “fulfills yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection,” and
involve personal “expression, intimacy, and spirituality”;35 (2) an association in
the form of a union involving commitment and intimacy, which “dignifies
couples who ‘wish to define themselves by their commitment to each other’”;36
(3) a safeguard for families and children that provides a legal structure for family
life, affording permanency and stability without which children suffer stigma,
may result in uncertain family life, and whose denial can “harm and humiliate the
children of same-sex couples”;37 (4) a recognition of families as foundational for
social order, which benefits from the symbolic recognition of the union of a
couple by civil society and provides material support for the household.38 The
Court also identified some of the legal aspects of marital status including
taxation, inheritance, spousal privilege, medical decision-making, rights and
benefits of survivors, health insurance, child custody, support, and visitation.39
The Court concluded that these principles reveal no difference between
same-sex and opposite-sex couples with respect to the material aspects of
marriage and further observed that “[s]ame-sex couples, too, may aspire to the
transcendent purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in its highest meaning.”40
C. Procreation Not Essential to Marriage
The Court significantly omitted procreation as a central element or tenant of
marriage from its litany of the significant aspects of marriage. Unabashedly the
Court stated: “An ability, desire, or promise to procreate is not and has not been
a prerequisite for a valid marriage in any State.”41 Without specifically citing the
Court’s earlier opinions dealing with contraception or abortion, the Court

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (majority opinion).
Id. at 2600.
Id. at 2599-00.
Id. at 2600.
Id. at 2601.
Id. at 2602-03.
Id. at 2601.
Id. at 2602.
Id. at 2601.
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asserted: “In light of precedent protecting the right of a married couple not to
procreate, it cannot be said the Court or States have conditioned the right to
marry on the capacity or commitment to procreate.”42 It is certainly true that
sterile individuals as well as women past child-bearing age are permitted to
marry. Therefore, rather that understanding procreation as an essential feature of
marriage, the Court viewed procreation as a possible incident of marriage and
concluded: “The constitutional marriage right has many aspects, of which
childbearing is only one.”43 It is on this point that the majority had its most
significant difference with the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, who
asserted that the “universal definition of marriage as the union of a man and a
woman . . . arose in the nature of things to meet a vital need: ensuring that
children are conceived by a mother and father committed to raising them in the
stable conditions of a lifelong relationship.”44
Justice Kennedy acknowledged the significance of marriage as an ancient
tradition involving a “gender-differentiated union of man and woman” in which
the parties committed themselves to each other in a transformative relationship.45
Moreover, it was his identification of the “transcendent importance of marriage”
that promises nobility to those who commit themselves to each other through
marriage which led Justice Kennedy to identify this as the significant interest that
same-sex couples have in obtaining access to marriage.46 Although Justice
Kennedy later took up the question of equal protection, it is important to observe
that he acknowledged the legitimacy of those in a same-sex relationship to be
defined by their homosexuality, which Justice Kennedy recognized as involving
an “immutable nature” that may be equated with be an immutable characteristic
or trait which has played an important role in obtaining protection under the

42. Id. From the beginning of the litigation over the right of same-sex couples to marry,
courts considered whether the state interest in procreation by an opposite-sex couple was a valid
state interest justifying exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage. This interest was asserted by
the state of Massachusetts in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003). Chief Justice Margaret Marshall found this a justifiable state interest, but not one justifying
exclusion of gay and lesbian couples from marriage:
General laws c. 207 contains no requirement that the applicants for a marriage license
attest to their ability or intention to conceive children by coitus. Fertility is not a
condition of marriage, nor is it grounds for divorce. People who have never
consummated their marriage, and never plan to, may be and stay married. People who
cannot stir from their deathbed may marry. While it is certainly true that many, perhaps
most, married couples have children together (assisted or unassisted), it is the exclusive
and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not the begetting
of children, that is the sine qua non of marriage . . . .
Id. at 961.
43. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.
44. Id. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 2594 (majority opinion).
46. Id.
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Equal Protection Clause.47 This puts the same-sex couple on par with the
petitioners in Loving, in which the Court presumed race is an immutable
characteristic requiring strict scrutiny when determining the equal protection
claims of the litigants.48 In considering a right to marry for same-sex couples,
Kennedy asserted that “their immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage
is their only real path to this profound commitment,” which is only available to
a couple through marriage.49
D. Changing Concepts of Marriage and Attitudes about Homosexuality
The Court did not view marriage as an unchanging or fixed institution,
rather: “The history of marriage is one of both continuity and change . . . [it] has
evolved over time.”50 The Court viewed the evolution from arranged marriage to
marriage by choice as reflecting the understanding of marriage as a voluntary
contract.51 The abandonment of the doctrine of coverture, which treated a married
man and woman as a single male-dominated legal entity, was seen as reflecting
a change in the status of women.52 Similarly, there have been changes in the
status of gays and lesbians who are no longer treated as isolated individuals
seeking sexual gratification, whose acts of intimacy are no longer deemed to be
immoral and subject to criminal prosecution, and who are no longer barred from
government employment, military service, or immigration because of their sexual
orientation.53 Rather than a psychiatric illness, the Court asserted that sexual
orientation (homosexuality) is “both a normal expression of human sexuality and
immutable.”54

47. Id.; see Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d. 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated en banc, 875
F.2d. 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he Supreme Court has often focused on immutability, and has
sometimes described the recognized suspect class as having immutable traits.”). See, e.g., Parham
v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (describing race, national origin, alienage, illegitimacy, and gender
as immutable).
48. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). Chief Justice Warren writing for an
unanimous court: “At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications,
especially suspect on criminal statutes, be subject to the most rigid scrutiny; and, if they are ever
to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state
objective . . . .” Id. at 11.
49. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594 (majority opinion).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2596.
54. Id. In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”) eliminated the classification
of homosexuality as a mental disorder from its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychiatric
Disorders (DSM II) (1973). Although the APA has not used the term “immutable,” in a 1998
position paper adopted by the APA Board of Directors the APA opposed any psychiatric treatment,
such as “reparative” or “conversion” therapy, which assumed that homosexuality was a condition
that could be cured or a trait that could be changed. Position Statement on Psychiatric Treatment
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The Court also traced the changing status and treatment of homosexuals
under the Constitution.55 The Court’s earliest explicit consideration of the legal
status of homosexuals was in Bowers v. Hardwick, upholding the
constitutionality of a state law authorizing the criminal prosecution of
homosexual sodomy.56 A decade later in Romer v. Evans, the Court struck down
an amendment to a state constitution that prohibited any subdivision of the state
government from providing protection against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.57 Then in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court found state criminal sodomy
laws unconstitutional, overturning a same-sex sodomy conviction.58 It is perhaps
relevant that Justice Kennedy wrote the opinions for the Court in both Romer and
Lawrence.59
E. Developments in Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage
The Court provided a list of all state and federal decisions addressing samesex marriage, along with a list of state legislation legalizing same-sex marriage
in two appendices.60 In addition, the Court identified the earliest state decisions
dealing with same-sex marriage.61 The first is the 1993 decision of the Supreme
Court of Hawaii in Baehr v. Lewin, holding that a law restricting marriage to
opposite-sex couples involved a classification on the basis of sex, which was
subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution.62 The Court identified
the first judicial decision recognizing a right of same-sex couples to marry in
2003 by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge v. Department

and Sexual Orientation, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (1998), https://www.camft.org/images/PDFs/
SOCE/APA_Position_Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/83VT-SJ2E?type=source].
55. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596-97 (majority opinion).
56. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). In its second sodomy opinion, the Court
stated: “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to
remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.” Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
57. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
58. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
59. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Romer, 517 U.S. 620.
60. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608-11. Appendix A provides a list of all state and federal
decisions addressing same-sex marriage, including separate lists of United States Court of Appeals
decisions, United States District Court decisions, and state highest court decisions. Appendix B
provides a list of state legislation and judicial decisions legalizing same-sex marriage.
61. Id. at 2596-97.
62. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993). On remand in Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV.911394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), Judge Kevin Chang ruled that none
of the state’s arguments represented a compelling state interest justifying the invidious
discrimination present in the state marriage law. However, a referendum amending its state
constitution the state legislature was authorized to limit marriage to one man and one woman. HAW.
CONST . art. 1 § 23.
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of Public Health.63 Additional state courts as well as a number of federal district
courts and courts of appeal found states prohibiting same-sex couples from
marrying to be unconstitutional.64
A significant counter or reactive response to efforts to obtain access to
marriage by same-sex couples was the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) in 1996, which defined marriage for all federal law purposes as “only
a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.”65 Justice
Kennedy noted that the Court in 2013, in United States v. Windsor (again Justice
Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court), invalidated that part of DOMA, which
barred the federal government from treating lawfully licensed state same-sex
marriage as invalid for the purposes of federal law.66 Justice Kennedy noted the
Court held DOMA “impermissibly disparaged those same-sex couples ‘who
wanted to affirm their commitment to one another before their children, their
family, their friends, and their community.’”67 Just as Lawrence seemed to
anticipate the decision in Obergefell, the Windsor opinion set out many of the
interests of same-sex couples to be validated by the right to marry.68
Justice Kennedy observed that although there had been numerous opinions
finding a constitutional basis for the access of same-sex couples to marriage, the
principal exception was the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit that produced a disparity in federal case law and resulted in a
division among the states on the issue of same-sex marriage.69 It was this
disparity that gave rise to the instant case.70
The Court viewed the analysis of the history and tradition of marriage as
significant for establishing the value of marriage, but not the identity of those
who should have access to the institution.71 As discussed earlier in this Article,

63. 798 N.E.2d. 941 (Mass. 2003).
64. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608-10.
65. Id. at 2597 (citing 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675 (2013)) (majority opinion). DOMA was enacted by Congress in reaction to the Hawaii
litigation dealing with same-sex marriage in which the state supreme court decided that the state
needed to provide a compelling justification to deny same-sex couples access to marriage. The
reaction of Congress to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s recognition of a right to samesex marriage under the state constitution was a failed effort to pass a Federal Marriage Amendment
(FMA) to the United States Constitution in 2004 which read as follows:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.
Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any state, shall be construed to require
that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the
union of a man and a woman.
S.J. Res. 30, 108th Cong. (2004).
66. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681.
67. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597 (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689) (majority opinion).
68. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693-95.
69. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597 (majority opinion).
70. See id. at 2584.
71. Id. at 2593-95.
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the definition of marriage as between a man and a woman cannot be the sole
basis for denying access of same-sex couples to marriage: Justice Kennedy
asserted that if the right to marriage was defined by those who have been
recognized in the past as having the right to marry, then the established practice
could serve as the continued justification for exclusion, as new groups could not
gain access to the rights to marry because of their previous denial.72 Similarly,
Justice Kennedy maintained that it is a mistake to consider this a matter of a
“right to same-sex marriage” rather than a “right to marry.”73 Justice Kennedy
explicitly asserted that the methodology urged by the Court’s opinion in
Washington v. Glucksberg—that there be a “careful description” of the
fundamental rights—was inappropriate in this case.74 Here there was an explicit
effort to avoid the mistake the Court made in formulating the issue in Bowers
(homosexual sodomy) and instead more appropriately formulate the issue, as it
did in Lawrence (intimate relations). The discussion of “intimacy” in Lawrence
may be viewed as equivalent to the discussion of “marriage” in this case. Justice
Kennedy reasoned: “Loving did not ask about a ‘right to interracial marriage’;
Turner did not ask about a ‘right of inmates to marry’; and Zablocki did not ask
about a ‘right of fathers with unpaid child support duties to marry.’”75 Instead,
Justice Kennedy maintained “each case inquired about the right to marry in its
comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification for excluding
the relevant class from the right” to marry.76
The Court itself manifested the major social shift in attitudes toward gays
and lesbians by accepting homosexuality as normal and immutable and endorsing
the view that same-sex couples are worthy of respect.77 However, the Court
recognized that others may not personally share the Court’s own view.78
Nevertheless, since the issue was the legal access of same-sex couples to the
fundamental right of marriage, it clearly would be wrong to give effect to that
personal opposition, as it would limit marriage to opposite-sex couples and
support “an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty
is then denied.”79 Instead, the Court concluded that as a matter of substantive due
process “same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as oppositesex couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood
to deny them this right.”80

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 2602.
See id.
Id. (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 2584.
Id. at 2602.
Id.
Id.

2016]

OBERGEFELL V. HODGES

377

F. Equal Protection and the Claim of Same-Sex Couples to Marry
The Court proceeded with an analysis based on the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.81 Justice Kennedy did not invoke a conventional
equal protection analysis; he did not define a protected class nor did he identify
the characteristics that justify a specific level of scrutiny to determine whether
that class has been denied some governmental benefit or been subjected to a
governmental restraint without the appropriate significant justification.82 Instead,
Justice Kennedy adopted an approach that identified an interconnection between
Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause, which involved a “synergy
between the two protections.”83 Both clauses were viewed as supporting claims
to fundamental liberties: “Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal
protection . . . [in some instances] may be instructive as to the meaning and reach
of the other,” although either clause “may be thought to capture the essence of
the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses
may converge.”84 Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the recognition of the
interlocking nature of these constitutional safeguards in the context of the legal
treatment of gays and lesbians strengthened the claims to a basic liberty, which
was previously set out in his opinion in Lawrence.85 In Lawrence, Kennedy
wrote, “Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for
conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important
respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”86
The Court identified the interconnection of liberty and equality specifically
discussed in Lawrence as both explicitly and implicitly underlying previous
decisions dealing with access to marriage.87 The Court in Loving invalidated the
prohibition on interracial marriage under the Equal Protection and Due Process

81. See id. 2602-05.
82. See id. at 2584. Although briefs filed with the Court and state, and various federal courts
have employed an analysis using tiers of equal protection review, the Supreme Court has not
applied the three tier analysis of rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny in gay rights
cases for the last twenty-five years. In the In re Marriage Cases, 183 P. 3d. 384, 401 (Cal. 2008),
the Supreme Court of California ruled that sexual orientation is a suspect classification for the same
reason as race. The Ninth Circuit in Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 468 (9th Cir. 2014), ruled that
sexual orientation discrimination is a suspect class and applied heightened scrutiny to strike down
the Idaho ban on same-sex marriage. The majority opinion in Obergefell lacked any mention of sex
discrimination as an argument in determining the right of same-sex couples to marry. From the
point of view of gay rights advocates, the failure to adopt an analysis of sexual orientation as a
suspect class limits the effective use of Obergefell in expanding state and federal anti-discrimination
laws in providing further protection for gays and lesbians in employment and public
accommodation.
83. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602-03 (majority opinion).
84. Id. at 2603.
85. Id. at 2604 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003)).
86. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
87. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603-04 (majority opinion).
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Clauses because “restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial
classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause” and
“classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of
the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty
without due process of law.”88 The Court in Zablocki directly invoked the Equal
Protection Clause to invalidate a law barring fathers who were behind in childsupport payments from marrying without judicial approval; however, Justice
Kennedy maintained that “[t]he equal protection analysis depended in central
part on the Court’s holding that the law burdened a right ‘of fundamental
importance.’”89
It was in the denial of equal access to the benefits of marriage that the Court
located the primary denial of equal protection. However, this denial of benefits
was directly related to the denial of the basic right of marriage itself.90 Other
precedents dealing with marriage and sex-based classifications were cited and
invoked as support for the view that the Equal Protection Clause “can help to
identify and correct inequalities in the institution of marriage, vindicating
precepts of liberty and equality under the Constitution.”91 The Court maintained
that the dynamic of liberty and equal protection provides significant insight to
claims of same-sex couples to marriage because: “It is now clear that the
challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and it must be further
acknowledged that they abridge central precepts of equality.”92 The inequality
identified by the Court was the denial to same-sex couples of all the benefit
afforded to opposite-sex couples by access to marriage.93 This analysis led to the
holding of the Court:
[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the
person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of
that right and that liberty. The Court now holds that same-sex couples
may exercise the fundamental right to marry.94

88. Id. at 2603 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
89. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
90. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (majority opinion).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2604-05 (emphasis added). By basing his opinion on the fundamental right to marry
through an analysis involving the synergy of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, Justice
Kennedy avoided the need to find the presence of animus as an obstacle for same-sex couples to
marriage. In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013), Justice Kennedy determined that an animus against gays and lesbians was the basis for
unjustified discrimination. Although it might be possible to find cases for animus against same-sex
couples in some recent statutory enactment specifying that marriage is restricted to one man and one
woman relations, the fact that generally marriage has been so limited in history precludes a
convincing argument that development of traditional marriage provides any evidence toward gays

2016]

OBERGEFELL V. HODGES

379

The Court stated that in overruling Baker v. Nelson, where it had declined to
review (for lack of a substantial federal question) a decision of the Minnesota
Supreme Court finding that the state’s Equal Rights Act (ERA) did not invalidate
the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage.95 Moreover, the Court declared
state laws invalid to the extent that they excluded same-sex couples from
marriage.96
G. The Need for Supreme Court Recognition that the Right to Marry Extends
to Same-Sex Couples
At this point, the Court’s opinion may be summed up as holding that samesex couples have a fundamental right to marry with access to all the benefits
bestowed by marriage. The basic argument is that if the state creates an
institution such as marriage with its many legal entitlements, it must extend
access to that institution to all citizens unless it has a compelling justification for
excluding a class of citizens from that institution or denying them its benefits.
The Court implicitly found no compelling justification to exclude same-sex
couples from the benefits of marriage.
The Court proceeded to consider some of the arguments directed against its
decision, including claims that its decision was a usurpation of the democratic
process,97 would harm traditional marriage,98 and would interfere with religious
liberty.99 The Court maintained there had been significant public debate on the
issue including legislative enactments and extensive litigation.100 In fact, this
litigation had led to a disagreement among the federal courts of appeal, which the
United States Supreme Court was bound to resolve.101 More significantly, the
Court maintained that there was a fundamental right at issue and it was the
obligation of the Court under the Constitution to vindicate valid claims by
minorities to basic rights.102
Although the Court recognized the democratic process as most often
providing the appropriate process for resolving conflicts and accommodating
change, when claims to individual rights are raised, it is the stated obligation of
the Court to determine whether such claims entail freedom and liberties secured
by the Constitution.103 When this is the case, the democratic process may be too

and lesbians whatsoever. Instead, finding that same-sex couples have a “fundamental right to
marry” resulted in a shifting of the burden to the state to establish a legitimate justification for
exclusion.
95. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605 (majority opinion).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2605-06.
98. Id. at 2606-07.
99. Id. at 2607.
100. Id. at 2605.
101. Id. at 2606.
102. Id. at 2605.
103. Id. at 2605-06.
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slow or involve denial of rights of minorities.104 According to the Court: “The
idea of the Constitution was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes
of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the Courts.”105
The Court maintained that it was deciding a legal question of constitutional
dimensions and that the delay in vindicating that claim would cause harm to the
same-sex couples.106 In fact, the Court referred to the specific facts of the case
before it as establishing the urgency for the recognition of the fundamental right
to marriage that is at stake in these cases.107
H. No Threat to Traditional Marriage or Religious Liberty
The Court found the argument that recognition of same-sex marriage will
injure traditional marriage unpersuasive.108 The claim that its decision would lead
to fewer opposite-sex marriages was said by the Court to be counterintuitive.109
According to the Court, the reason couples marry and have children is “based on
many personal, romantic, and practical considerations; and it is unrealistic to
conclude that an opposite-sex couple would choose not to marry simply because
same-sex couples may do so.”110
The Court maintained that its decision did not pose any threat to religious

104. Id.
105. Id. (citing W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
106. Id. at 2606.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2606-07.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2607. The Court did not consider the argument that the “exclusiveness” of
traditional marriage may have been a factor in some individual’s choice to marry. As the availability
of marriage is extended to those individuals previously excluded, the special stature of traditional
marriage may be eroded. Another argument is that same-sex marriage may be more unstable than
opposite-sex marriage. For example, if men are more likely to be promiscuous than women,
marriages of two men may be more subject to adultery or divorce. If the frequency of divorce is
increased, this may have a destabilizing effect on opposite-sex marriage partners who are influenced
negatively by the increased occurrence of divorce. It may be argued that even if such concerns are
valid, the interest of same-sex couples in access to the fundamental right of marriage outweighs
such concerns. See Stanley Kurtz, The Libertarian Question: Incest, Homosexuality, and Adultery,
in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 265-68 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E.
Rosenbaum eds., 2d ed. 2004). Kurtz wrote: “Gay marriage would set in motion a series of threats
to the ethos of monogamy from which the institution of marriage may never recover.” Id. However,
Kurtz recognized that the general abandonment of the taboo against homosexuality and the claims
to personal freedom by homosexuals to the right to marry justify recognition of same-sex marriage.
Id. Kurtz concluded: “I would rather accept some disruption in family stability than go back to the
days when homosexuality itself was deeply tabooed. The increase in freedom and fairness is worth
it.” Id.
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liberty.111 It cited the First Amendment as providing sufficient protection to
religious organizations and for people to follow their religious beliefs in their
family life.112 It is, however, in the area of religious practice and belief that the
Court’s decision is likely to raise the most significant legal disputes. Of course,
no religious institution will be required to officiate or bless same-sex marriage.
However, the church-related organizations involved in education, providing
social services, and operating health care facilities provide likely sites for conflict
with religious rejection or condemnation of same-sex marriage and the Court’s
decision. Anti-discrimination laws are likely to be invoked to challenge denials
of employment or service such as refusals to place children with same-sex
couples by an adoption agency administered by religious institutions such as the
Roman Catholic Church.113 The Court recognized the likelihood of continuing
open debate on the issue of same-sex marriage, but it failed to anticipate the
likelihood of significant legal dispute and the enactment of freedom of
conscience laws justifying exclusion or denial of service to same-sex couples.
The Court, nevertheless, was clear on its priorities: although religious institutions
may refuse to provide any recognition of same-sex marriage, “[t]he Constitution
. . . does not permit the state to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same
terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.”114
The Court’s positive response to the second question before the
Court—whether the Constitution requires states to recognize same-sex marriage
validly performed out of state—was logically inevitable. The Court recognized
that the harm inflicted on individuals by state bans on same-sex marriage was
exactly the same harm inflicted by refusal to recognize a same-sex marriage
validly established in another state.115 Therefore, the Court found there was no
lawful basis for a state to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage
performed in another state.116
I. The Court’s Praise of Marriage
The Court concluded with a panegyric to marriage, which it found “embodies

111. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607 (majority opinion).
112. Id.
113. See Donald H. J. Hermann, Defending the Public Good and Traditional Society: NonScriptural Religious Objections to Same-Sex Marriage, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (2014). The Church
maintained that its opposition to same-sex marriage has a natural law basis which precludes Church
complicity in any recognition of same-sex marriage. Id. at 3. In Illinois, Catholic Charities
discontinued operating an agency placing children in foster homes or administering adoptions rather
than comply with a state requirement that agencies receiving state funding not discriminate against
same-sex couples in the placement of children. See, e.g., Rockford Diocese to Discontinue Adoption
Services, WIFR (May 27, 2011), http://www.wifr.com/home/headlines/Rockford_Diocese_
to_Discontinue_Adoption_Services_122680219.html [http://perma.cc/B4F9-C7B4].
114. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607 (majority opinion).
115. Id. at 2607-08.
116. Id. at 2608.
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the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family.”117 It is this
encomium which was the primary focus of Justice Scalia’s mocking dissent,
which, for example, suggested that monogamous marriage in fact restricted the
occasions for an individual to engage various partners in acts of intimacy. Justice
Scalia carped that “freedom of intimacy is abridged rather than expanded by
marriage. Ask the nearest hippie.”118 The Court, however, maintained that: “In
forming a marital union, two people become something greater than once they
were . . . marriage embodies a love that may endure even past death.”119 It is
marriage which the Court found to be a fundamental right that is sought by samesex couples who do not want “to be condemned to live in loneliness” as “[t]hey
ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law” by obtaining access to the
fundamental right of marriage as granted by the Court through its interpretation
of the Constitution.120
II. DISSENTING OPINIONS
Each of the four dissenting Justices issued an opinion joined by one or more
of the other dissenting justices.121 It is not clear whether some of the dissenting
justices opposed any legal recognition of same-sex marriage, but all were
opposed to such recognition being established by a decision of the United States
Supreme Court.122
A. Dissent of Chief Justice Roberts
1. Judicial Usurpation of Democratic Process.—Chief Justice Roberts,
joined by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, characterized the Court’s opinion
as rooted in social and policy considerations, rather than legal analysis.123 The
Chief Justice dismissingly denominated the majority as “[f]ive lawyers . . . [who]
enacted their own vision of marriage as a matter of constitutional law.”124 The
Chief Justice’s position was that same-sex marriage was appropriately a matter
for public debate to be resolved by the democratic process in legislatures, not in
the courts.125 Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts took the view that the fundamental
right to marry was limited by the definition of marriage as a union of a man and
a woman.126 Although the “Constitution does not exact any one theory of
marriage,” he reasoned that it is up to the people through the democratic process

117. Id.
118. Id. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 2608 (majority opinion).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2591.
122. See id. at 2611-43 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting; Scalia, J., dissenting; Thomas, J., dissenting;
Alito, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 2612.
125. Id. at 2611–12.
126. Id. at 2612.
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to retain or change the core elements of marriage.127 According to the Chief
Justice, there is no provision of the Constitution or any Court precedent that
provided a legitimate basis for the Court’s decision.128 Although Chief Justice
Roberts defended heterosexual marriage, he asserted that his dissent “is not about
whether, in my judgment, the institution of marriage should be changed to
include same-sex couples,” but a dissent from what he considered judicial
usurpation of the democratic process.129
2. Marriage Is the Union of a Man and a Woman for Procreation.—For the
Chief Justice, the issue was not, as the majority stated, the “right to marry” or
“marriage equality,” but “what constitutes ‘marriage,’ or—more precisely—who
decides what constitutes ‘marriage’?”130 Chief Justice Roberts found the
definition of marriage as the union of a man and a woman to be determinative.131
Furthermore, he endorsed the view that marriage developed to ensure that
“children are conceived by a mother and father committed to raising them in the
stable conditions of a lifelong relationship.”132 Procreation and child rearing were
seen as essential features of traditional marriage.133 The Chief Justice’s analysis
ignored the fact, recognized by the Court, that sterile individuals, women past
child-bearing age, and bed-ridden individuals are allowed to marry.134 Married
couples are not required to produce children.135 In fact a whole series of decisions
of the Court support the assertion that married couples may use contraception and
abortion to prevent the birth of children.136 It is true, as the Chief Justice stated,

127. Id. at 2611.
128. Id. at 2612.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2613.
132. Id. The position taken by Chief Justice Roberts was first taken in a judicial opinion in a
majority opinion of the Court of Appeals of New York in Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7-8
(N.Y. 2006), where Justice Smith wrote:
There are at least two grounds that rationally support the limitation on marriage [to
opposite-sex couples] . . . First, the Legislature could rationally decide that, for the
welfare of children, it is more important to promote stability, and to avoid instability,
in opposite-sex than same-sex relationships . . . There is a second reason: The
Legislature could rationally believe that it is better, other things being equal, for
children to grow up with both a mother and a father . . . In sum, there are rational
grounds on which the Legislature could choose to restrict marriage to couples of
opposite sex.
Id.
133. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 2601 (majority opinion).
135. Id.
136. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (right to abortion); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of
individuals to use contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 379 (1965) (right of couple
to use contraception).

384

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:367

that “[t]he Constitution itself says nothing about marriage,”137 but neither does
the Constitution say anything directly about contraception or abortion, but there
are precedents on those matters that the majority invoked to support its
decision.138
Chief Justice Roberts reviewed most of the opinions cited by the majority,
including Loving v. Virginia, Skinner v. Oklahoma, and Zablocki v. Redhail, and
found that each of the opinions presumed a procreative element.139 The Chief
Justice concluded that in all of the Court’s previous decisions dealing with
marriage, “the core meaning of marriage has endured.”140
The Chief Justice conceded there had been social and legal changes since
Baker v. Nelson, in which the Court summarily dismissed on appeal from a state
court the denial of a right to a marriage license by a gay couple.141 He also
acknowledged decisions of state courts based on provisions of the relevant state
constitution and enactment of legislation extending the right to marry to same-sex
couples.142 Nevertheless, the Chief Justice identified the issue before the Court
as whether the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution required the states to
license and recognize marriage between same-sex couples.143 The Chief Justice
maintained that the Court should uphold the Sixth Circuit’s decision, which held
that “petitioners had not made ‘the case for constitutionalizing the definition of
marriage and for removing the issue from the place it has been since the
founding: in the hands of state voters.’”144
3. Critique of Court’s Substantive Due Process Analysis.—The Chief Justice
provided a critique of the majority’s substantive due process analysis.145 The
Chief Justice faulted the majority for not addressing the issue of whether same-

137. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 2599 (majority opinion).
139. Id. at 2614 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386
(1978) (holding that a deadbeat dad could not be prohibited from marriage and having children),
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing the right of interracial couples to marry as
“fundamental to our very existence and survival,” which the Chief Justice stated revealed an
“understanding that necessarily implies a procreative component”), and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that sterilization as a criminal punishment is not permitted because
“[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the continued very existence and survival of the
race”)).
140. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2615 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
141. Id. (citing Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)).
142. Id. Although the public media reported that thirty-seven states recognized marriage
between same-sex partners, many of these states were mandated to do so by federal court decisions.
The Chief Justice correctly reported: “In all, voters and legislators in eleven states and the District
of Columbia have changed their definitions of marriage to include same-sex couples. The highest
courts of five states have decreed the same result under their own Constitutions.” Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 403 (6th Cir. 2014)).
145. See id. at 2615-18.
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sex marriage was a fundamental right by using what he asserted is the basic
approach to substantive due process, which involves a claim to liberty—in this
case same-sex marriage—that is so rooted in the traditions and conscience of the
people of the United States that it should be ranked as fundamental and cannot
be deprived without compelling justification.146
The Chief Justice engaged in a lengthy analysis of the early substantive due
process cases, particularly emphasizing Lochner v. New York and its progeny.147
According to the Chief Justice, Lochner embodied a non-constitutional economic
theory of freedom of contract based on the belief of the justices as to whether a
law was for the public good.148 But the Court subsequently rejected that approach
on the grounds that the Court does “not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the
wisdom of legislation.”149
Although the Lochner approach to substantive due process had been rejected,
the Chief Justice recognized that there is a valid “doctrine of implied
fundamental rights.”150 But, he maintained application of this doctrine required
rigor in carefully formulating the right at issue and a determination of whether
history and tradition supported recognition of the claim of fundamental right.151
It was the Chief Justice’s view that the majority failed to adhere to the
methodological approach the Court developed in analyzing claims based on
substantive due process.152 According to the Chief Justice: “The majority
acknowledges none of this doctrinal background . . .[i]ts aggressive application
of substantive due process breaks sharply with decades of precedent and returns
the Court to the unprincipled approach of Lochner.”153
The Chief Justice challenged the majority’s interpretation of past precedent
as establishing a fundamental right to marry that provided that anyone who wants
to marry has a constitutional right to marry.154 According to the Chief Justice, the
previous cases did not determine who could marry, but instead those cases
required a state to justify barriers to marriage as marriage is traditionally
understood to be a union of a man and a woman.155
According to the Chief Justice, Loving involved racial restrictions on

146. Id. at 2616 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
147. See id. at 2617-19 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (declaring
unconstitutional a law that imposed a limit on the number of hours bakers could work)).
148. Id. at 2617.
149. Id. (citing Daybrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952)). Moreover, the
Chief Justice maintained that it has become an accepted rule that the Court will not hold laws
unconstitutional simply because it found them “unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a
particular school of thought.” Id. at 2617-18. (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348
U.S. 483, 488 (1955)).
150. Id. at 2618 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2618-19.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2619.
155. Id.
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marriage, Zablocki involved restrictions based on failure to provide child support,
and Turner involved restriction based on status as a prisoner.156 According to the
Chief Justice: “None of the laws at issue in those cases purported to change the
core definition of marriage as the union of a man and a woman.”157 This analysis
led him to the conclusion that while restrictions on marriage may be found
constitutionally invalid, it was another matter to make a state change its
definition of marriage, which is beyond the purview of the Court and appropriate
interpretation of the Constitution.158
The Chief Justice dismissed the Court’s reliance on the contraception cases,
maintaining that the opinions in those cases rested on concern about invasions
of “marital bedrooms” (Griswold v. Connecticut) and “the right to be let alone”
(Eisenstadt v. Baird).159 Moreover, according to the Chief Justice, Lawrence
should be properly viewed as a case involving governmental invasion of
privacy.160 According to the Chief Justice, all these cases involved government
intrusions which were found not to be constitutionally justified.161 However, this
case involved the recognition of an affirmative claim to a right, not an objection
to governmental intrusion into a right.
The Chief Justice maintained that the same-sex marriage case involved
neither restrictions on marriage nor intrusions into private relationships.162 He
concluded, “the privacy cases provide no support for the majority’s position.”163
According to the Chief Justice, “although the right to privacy recognized by our
precedent certainly plays a role in protecting the intimate conduct of same-sex
couples, it provides no affirmative right to redefine marriage and no basis for
striking down the laws at issue here.”164 As will be discussed later in this Article,
this assertion is at odds with the view of another dissenting justice (Scalia) who
asserted in his dissent in Lawrence, “[t]his case ‘does not involve’ the issue of
homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic
have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court.”165
According to the Chief Justice, the methodological error of the majority was
that the asserted failure to formulate the right at stake narrowly as the “right to
same-sex marriage” violated the method for determining fundamental rights for

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2620 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)).
160. Id. It should be noted, however, that the Court in Lawrence found a liberty interest in
intimate relations rather than rooting its holding in the right to privacy. Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
161. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2619-20.
162. Id. at 2620.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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purposes of a substantive due process analysis as established in Glucksberg.166
Moreover, the Chief Justice viewed the Court’s broad assertion that there is a
right to “define and express” one’s identity or that, “the right to personal choice
regarding marriage was inherent in the concept of individual autonomy,”167 as
adopting the expansive philosophical approach of Lochner, which it subsequently
and unequivocally rejected.168 In Lochner, the Court invoked the economic
philosophy of market capitalism; in this case, the Court adopted a philosophical
approach supporting individual sexual freedom and recognition of the validity of
same-sex relationships. This led the Chief Justice to the conclusion that “today’s
decision rests on nothing more than the majority’s own conviction that same-sex
couples should be allowed to marry because they want to, and that ‘it would
disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them the right.’”169
The Chief Justice questioned whether implicit in the majority’s approach
there was any reason to limit marriage to two persons.170 According to the Chief
Justice, embracing of same-sex marriage in the face of history and tradition was
greater than a move from two-person unions to plural unions which are even
today recognized in other cultures.171 The Chief Justice pointed out that if the
stigma experienced by children was a reason for extending the right to marry in
cases of same-sex parenting families, children with plural parents should be
viewed as having an equal concern to avoid the same stigma as children with
same-sex parents.172
4. Critique of Court’s Equal Protection Analysis.—The Chief Justice faulted
the majority for failing to employ the recognized methodology for analyzing
claims of discrimination in denial of basic rights.173 The Chief Justice observed
that the majority’s approach to equal protection lacked “anything resembling our
usual framework for deciding equal protection cases . . . in which judges ask
whether the classification the government is using is sufficiently related to the
goals it is pursuing.”174 Rather, the majority identified a “‘synergy between’ the
Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause,” leading to the conclusion
that the Equal Protection Clause provided an alternative basis for its holding.175
The Chief Justice maintained that “the majority fails to provide even a single
sentence explaining how the Equal Protection Clause supplies independent

166. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2620-21 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 2589 (majority opinion).
168. See id. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58
(1905) (noting “the general right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to
contract in relation to his own labor”)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2621-22.
171. Id. at 2621.
172. Id. at 2622.
173. Id. at 2623.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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weight for its position.”176
The Chief Justice argued there was no Equal Protection violation because the
ability to procreate effectively distinguished opposite-sex couples from same-sex
couples 177 so that the marriage laws limited to a man and a woman were
rationally related to the state’s “legitimate state interest” in preserving the
traditional institution of marriage.178 It is clear that the Chief Justice’s argument
depended on the premise that procreation is an essential element of marriage, a
premise that the majority challenged. According to the Chief Justice, the other
features of marriage—love, affection, mutuality, care, and companionship—were
all ancillary benefits that accompanied marriage as defined by the state.179
The Chief Justices went on to identify possible negative consequences
following from the Court’s decision.180 These included the erosion of the Court’s
legitimacy as a result of “the majority’s extravagant conception of judicial
supremacy,” which usurped the democratic process.181 Because the Court lacked
the ability to deal with ancillary matters that were raised by same-sex marriage,
he argued the rights of others would be affected, as “[t]oday’s decision, for
example, creates serious questions about religious liberty.”182 The Chief Justice
expressed significant concern on how recognition of same-sex marriage would
affect religiously-affiliated institutions such as religiously sponsored schools and
social service agencies.183
Finally, the Chief Justice faulted the rhetoric of the majority’s opinion for
disparaging those who oppose same-sex marriage and implying that opponents
of same-sex marriage are bigots and are not fair minded.184 According to the
Chief Justice, this was an effect of the overreaching Court, by which it imposed
the personal view of five justices on matters of sexuality that “had nothing to do
with the Constitution.”185

176. Id.
177. See id. at 2613-14.
178. Id. at 2623.
179. See id. at 2613-14.
180. See id. at 2624-26.
181. Id. at 2624.
182. Id. at 2625.
183. Id. at 2625-26. The Chief Justice recognized that:
Hard questions arise when people of faith exercise religion in ways that may be seen to
conflict with the new right to same-sex marriage—when, for example, religious colleges
provide married students housing only to opposite-sex married couples, or a religious
adoption agency declines to place children with same-sex married couples . . . [and] the
tax exemptions of some religious institutions would be in question if they opposed
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B. Dissent of Justice Scalia
1. Concern with Proper Role of the Judiciary.—Justice Scalia in his dissent
(joined by Justice Thomas) immediately declared that the subject of the case,
same-sex marriage, was of little significance to him and it received almost no
consideration in his dissent.186 He wrote, “[t]he substance of today’s decree is not
of immense personal importance to me.”187 The reason for this bold statement
may be the views he earlier expressed in his dissent in Lawrence, which will be
discussed later in this Article. Instead, Justice Scalia focused his attention on the
issue of the proper role of the judiciary in interpreting the Constitution.188 He
then went on to offer a scathing critique of the style of the majority’s opinion,
which he viewed as “pretentious” in style, “egotistic” in content, and setting out
“showy profundities” which reflect the predilections of the justices in the
majority.189
In his dissent, Justice Scalia expressed concern for the future of democracy,
which he believed is threatened by judicial activism.190 Issues of policy such as
same-sex marriage are viewed properly as matters of public debate.191 For Justice
Scalia, the Constitution established a federal system in which the subject of the
regulation of domestic relations is the province of the states.192 Moreover, the
Fourteenth Amendment, which was at the heart of the Court’s decision, was not
meant to give the judiciary the power to alter traditional institutions such as
marriage.193 Ultimately, Justice Scalia maintained that the majority’s opinion was
not a statement of law, but instead, a public policy statement resulting in the
Court’s ruling being “an opinion lacking even a thin veneer of law.”194 Justice
Scalia maintained the Court’s decision was no more than “a naked judicial claim
to legislative—indeed, super-legislative—power,” which he asserted is at odds
with the Constitution.195 Democratic governance was undermined by the Court’s
opinion, according to Justice Scalia, because the kind of judicial activism
represented by the Court’s decision was rendered by a wholly unrepresentative
group of individuals, which he attempted to show as elite and from a restricted
segment of American society.196
2. Critique of the Style of the Majority Opinion.—The second part of Justice
Scalia’s dissent focused on his criticism of the style of the Court’s opinion,
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which he viewed as infected by judicial “hubris.”197 Surprisingly, Justice Scalia’s
critique itself adapted a style that at best can be described as idiosyncratic. A
quote from this section of the dissent captured the eccentric style adopted in
place of the usual logical style of rhetoric characteristic of judicial opinions.
Justice Scalia opined:
Rights, we are told, can “rise . . . from a better informed understanding
of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in
our own era.” (Huh? How can a better informed understanding of how
constitutional imperatives [whatever that means] define [whatever that
means] an urgent liberty [never mind], give birth to a right?).198
The gist of Justice Scalia’s criticism is that the substantive due process analysis
failed to conform to the accepted methodological analysis and instead reflected
“the majority’s likes and dislikes.”199
3. Justice Scalia’s Dissent in Lawrence Anticipating Recognition of SameSex Marriage.—One reason that Justice Scalia forewent any discussion of the
actual issue before the Court, “marriage of same-sex couples,” may be explained
by recalling his discussion in Lawrence v. Texas where he stated that the logical
implication of the Court’s opinion in that case was recognition of same-sex
marriage.200 After arguing that it was not unconstitutional for a state to prosecute
same-sex relations on the basis of majoritarian moral disapproval, Justice Scalia
maintained that the Court’s recognition of same-sex couples’ right to intimate
sexual relations legally and logically entailed the right of same-sex marriage
despite the majority’s disavowal of that position in its Lawrence opinion.201 In his
dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia wrote
The Court says that the present case “does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter.” Do not believe it. More illuminating
than this bald, unreasoned disclaimer is the progression of thought
displayed by an earlier passage in the Court’s opinion, which notes the
constitutional protections afforded to “personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education,” and then declares that “[p]ersons in a homosexual
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual
persons do.” Today’s opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional
law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and
homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is
concerned.202
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Justice Scalia’s view reflected the fact that the long-standing objection to samesex marriage was the underlying condemnation of homosexual acts as immoral.203
For example, the Roman Catholic Church’s condemnation of same-sex marriage
was based on the fact that homosexual unions are likely to involve homosexual
sexual acts, which are viewed as immoral because they are closed to the
possibility of reproduction and do not proceed from a genuine sexual
complementarity.204 Justice Scalia conceded in his Lawrence dissent that without
legal condemnation (based on moral judgment) of homosexuality, there was no
justification for denial of marriage to same-sex couples.205 In his Lawrence
dissent, Justice Scalia reasoned:
If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is “no legitimate state
interest” for purposes of proscribing that conduct, and if, as the Court
coos (casting all pretense of neutrality) “[w]hen sexuality finds overt
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be
but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring,” what
justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage
to homosexual couples exercising “[t]he liberty protected by the
Constitution.”206
As to the justification of the centrality of procreation to civil marriage, Justice
Scalia summarily dismissed it as an exclusion of same-sex couples from
marriage; he asserted: “Surely not the encouragement of procreation, since the
sterile and elderly are allowed to marry.”207 It seems clear why Justice Scalia
avoided discussion of the issue at stake in Obergefell, not because it was of no
“personal importance” to him, but because he was hoisted on his own petard by
his dissent opinion in Lawrence. In fact, his opinion in Lawrence may be viewed
as an outline for the Court’s opinion in Obergefell.
C. Dissent of Justice Thomas
1. Liberty and the Role of Government.—Justice Thomas in his dissent
(joined by Justice Scalia) focused principally on his understanding of liberty and
the role of government.208 Justice Thomas began his dissent with the premise that
liberty should be understood as freedom from governmental action, not
entitlement to governmental benefits.209 Justice Thomas rejected the validity of

203. See id. at 604-05.
204. Joseph C. Ratzinger & Angelo Amato, Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith:
Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual Persons,
V ATICAN (2003), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/
rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homosexual-unions_en.html [http://perma.cc/5MBV-F3DW].
205. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 604-05.
207. Id. at 605.
208. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2631-40 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 2631.
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substantive due process because it departed from the text of the Constitution.210
But he maintained that even under substantive due process, there was no basis for
a claim in liberty by same-sex couples to marry.211 According to Justice Thomas,
“liberty” should be understood in terms of physical restraint; or if understood
more broadly, liberty should be understood as freedom from government action,
not a right to a particular government entitlement.212
According to Justice Thomas, the claims of same-sex couples in the instant
case had nothing to do with liberty guaranteed by the Constitution since they had
not been “imprisoned or physically restrained by the States for participating in
same-sex relationships.”213 In fact, same-sex couples had freedom to co-habit,
raise children, hold marriage ceremonies, travel, and establish homes where they
wished without any access to marriage.214 According to Justice Thomas, the
same-sex couples involved in these cases before the Court were not asking for
removal of restrictions on their liberty, but they were asking for access to the
privileges and benefits of marriage.215 This demand to receive benefits, according
to Justice Thomas, had nothing to do with liberty properly understood, as
“receiving governmental recognition and benefits has nothing to do with any
understanding of ‘liberty’ that the Framers would have recognized.”216
2. Lack of Precedent for and Dangers Created by Recognition of Right to
Same-Sex Marriage.—Justice Thomas proceeded to analyze the principal
marriage precedents relied on by the majority as involving punishment or
privations of couples rather than establishing a right to marry or a right to access
to marriage.217 Loving is viewed as involving criminal prosecution for
cohabiting.218 Zablocki v. Redhail is understood as involving a man who was
threatened with a criminal penalty for remarrying because of his outstanding
child support obligations.219 And Turner v. Safley was said to involve state
inmates who were deprived of the opportunity of marrying without the
permission of the superintendent of the prison.220
According to Justice Thomas’s strained reading of these precedents dealing
with marriage, the denial of access to the right of marriage with access to its
benefits and privileges was not the issue, stating: “In none of those cases were
individuals denied solely governmental recognition and benefits associated with
marriage.”221
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Justice Thomas then proceeded to identify a series of objections to the
Court’s decision: it constituted a disregard of the democratic process,222 it posed
a threat to religious liberty,223 and it failed in its basic objective of advancing the
dignity of same-sex couples because the government is incapable of bestowing
dignity which is conferred by the Creator.224
D. Dissent of Justice Alito
1. Objection to Same-Sex Marriage.—Justice Alito’s dissent (joined by
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas) directly challenged the claim of a
constitutional right to same-sex marriage and suggested there may be good
reasons for not permitting same-sex marriage.225 The other dissents were silent
on the issue of the social interests challenged by the establishment of same-sex
marriage. Justice Alito saw real social harm from recognizing same-sex
marriage.226 Moreover, Justice Alito did not accept the majority’s definition of
the right at stake; instead Justice Alito adopted the view that the claim of right
to be examined was the “right to same-sex marriage.”227
Justice Alito began by expressing the view that the subject of same-sex
marriage was properly one of public debate and it was not an issue for resolution
through judicial interpretation of the Constitution.228 He asserted that the
Constitution had nothing to say about same-sex marriage and there was no basis
for finding the “right to same-sex marriage” as a liberty deeply rooted in history
and tradition.229
In analyzing the majority’s finding that the state has no valid reason for
denying same-sex couples access to marriage, Justice Alito challenged the
majority’s understanding of marriage.230 For Justice Alito, procreation is an
essential aspect of the institution of marriage, and it was a great error for the
majority to dismiss the significant instrumental relation between marriage and
procreation along with child rearing.231 According to Justice Alito, the majority
was mistaken in its view: “the fundamental purpose of marriage is to promote the
well-being of those who choose to marry” 232 and that the value of marriage lies
in the fact that it “provides emotional fulfillment and the promise of support in

222. Id. at 2637-38.
223. Id. at 2638-39.
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times of need.”233 According to Justice Alito, the majority was clearly wrong by
narrowly focusing on the “happiness of the persons who choose to marry” rather
than recognizing that marriage provides a protected place for procreation and
child rearing.234 Thus, Justice Alito concluded that the central feature of marriage
was ignored by the majority.235 According to Justice Alito, civil marriage was
established “to encourage potentially procreative conduct to take place within a
lasting unit that has long been thought to provide the best atmosphere for raising
children.”236
2. Harms Resulting from Same-Sex Marriage.—According to Justice Alito,
there has been a destructive disintegration of the link between marriage and
procreation.237 He expressed concern that forty percent of all children born in the
United States are born to unmarried women.238 According to Justice Alito, it was
reasonable to fear that recognition of same-sex marriage will further weaken the
bond between marriage and procreation.239 While conceding that there may be
reasonable debate on this issue, Justice Alito endorsed the view that judges do
not have the expertise to resolve the dispute on whether recognition of same-sex
marriage will have negative effect on traditional marriage.240 Instead, he argued
the Court, by an act of usurpation of the democratic process, arrogated to itself
the authority to discount the potential negative aspects of same-sex marriage and
to legitimize same-sex marriage.241
As was done in the other dissents, Justice Alito identified a series of
concerns about the implications of the Court’s decision, including challenges to
religious liberty, the undermining of federalism as the authority of the states is
marginalized, the lack of judicial restraint posing a danger to democracy, and the
“corruption of our legal culture’s conception of constitutional interpretation.”242
CONCLUSION
Obergefell v. Hodges is a landmark civil liberties decision. The decision
establishes that there is a fundamental right to marry to which same-sex couples
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have a legal right to access.243 While recognizing that traditional marriage
involved a union of a man and a woman, the Court identified this as an aspect of
traditional marriage which is open to change as society has come to accept the
validity of same-sex couple relationships.244 The Court analyzed the claim to
access to marriage as involving the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
and Equal Protection Clause.245 It was the Court’s view that the Due Process
Clause is not limited to procedural justice, as it also involves substantive due
process, which guarantees not only liberties provided explicitly in the text of the
Constitution, but also includes liberties that extend to certain personal choices
central to individual dignity and autonomy.246
According to the Court, the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause
are connected in that liberty and equal protection lead to a stronger understanding
of each other.247 The Due Process Clause established that there is a liberty
interest of same-sex couples to have access to the fundamental right to marry.248
The Equal Protection Clause required the state to license and recognize same-sex
marriage because there is no justification for exclusion of same-sex couples from
the benefits provided to married couples.249 The proffered justification of the
ability to procreate as an essential qualification for marriage was rejected since
the sterile, women of post-child bearing age, and bed ridden are able to marry.250
The Court held that the right to marry was a fundamental right inherent in the
liberty of the person under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that
right and that liberty.251
Dissenting justices objected to the resolution of the debate on same-sex
marriage by the Court rather than through the democratic process.252 The dissents
maintained there was no basis in the Constitution for finding a right to same-sex
marriage.253 They faulted the majority for failing to adhere to the established
method of substantive due process which would preclude finding a right to
“same-sex marriage” established by history and tradition.254 They also faulted the
majority for not adhering to the established methodology for resolving equal
protection claims by failing to identify a class subject to discrimination and a
heightened level of scrutiny to determine whether there was justification for the
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state’s discrimination.255 Some dissenting justices expressed concern that samesex marriage would weaken traditional marriage.256 Other expressed concern for
likely conflict with those asserting rights as same-sex married couples and those
invoking religious liberty or right of conscience.257
The decision in Obergefell guarantees gays and lesbians all the rights and
protections associated with marriage. However, the opinion in Obergefell
provides no explicit authority for further claims to rights by homosexuals (gays
and lesbians). There was little attention to establishing a class subject of
discrimination thus eligible to make claims for other rights or protections. The
majority does refer to the “immutable nature” of the individuals who relate as a
same-sex couple.258 The issue of “immutable characteristic” has often been a part
of analyzing a class seeking rights or protections under the Equal Protection
Clause and may play a role, as gays and lesbians invoke the Equal Protection
Clause as a bar to discrimination or denial of other liberties. Although the
opinion in Obergefell does not provide significant legal authority for further
development of gay and lesbian rights, the mere fact that gays and lesbians may
marry establishes their position in civil society, which is likely to lead in the
future to full integration of gays and lesbians into society with all the rights and
obligations of citizens.
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